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Objective: This paper addresses the following statistical question: ‘if genuine improvements in 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) were discovered that doubled the probability of 
resuscitation success in a series of randomized clinical trials, would they be recognized and 
incorporated into consensus guidelines?’ 
 
Methods: Statistical powers for hypothetical individual clinical trials comparing experimental 
and control CPR were computed as a function of the study N when the true probabilities for 
immediate survival, 24 h survival, and discharge survival in the experimental group were twice 
those in the control group. Next, the binomial distributions describing the numbers of statistically 
significant studies in a series of equally powered trials of the same intervention were determined. 
These were compared with varying criteria for consensus among expert reviewers, expressed in 
terms of the number of ‘positive’ studies showing a statistically significant difference that 
reviewers would require before approving the experimental method. 
 
Results: False-negative evaluations (i.e. failures to approve a technique that actually doubled 
survival) were extremely common under a wide range of realistic assumptions and consensus 
criteria, especially when simulated long-term survival data were considered. Similar methods 
showed that false-positive evaluations would be extremely rare, provided that at least two of the 
clinical trials in a series showed a statistically significant benefit of the experimental method.  
 
Conclusions: Optimization of evidence evaluation can and should be carried out to make better 
use of available data in creating resuscitation guidelines. One simple approach is the ‘two and 
one quarter test’: if at least two well-conducted studies in a series are significantly positive 
(P<0.05) comprising at least one-quarter of all studies in the series, a positive effect can be 
inferred with small Type I and Type II errors. In addition, greater reliance on modern, unbiased 
methods such as cumulative meta-analysis is needed to increase the sensitivity of evidence 
evaluation for detecting useful innovations in resuscitation. 
 
Keywords: Cardiopulmonary resuscitation; Guidelines; Human experimentation; Clinical trials; 
Meta-analysis; Standards 
 





Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is unusual among medical treatments in that clinical 
practice is determined largely by national or international guidelines and to a much lesser extent 
by the judgment of individual clinicians. Such standardization minimizes chaos in highly 
emergent situations, but also discourages innovation. Improvements must be blessed by 
guideline writing committees, which tend to follow implicit consensus criteria. The guidelines 
that direct the efforts of thousands of individuals worldwide in lifesaving efforts are formulated 
by committees of volunteer experts in organizations such as the European Resuscitation Council 
and the American Heart Association [1]. These experts are typically medical professionals who 
rely on traditional methods of literature review, prior experience, and clinical judgment to arrive 
at a consensus, to which the fewest committee members can strenuously object. A potential 
improvement in resuscitation guidelines is proposed, and consensus is achieved after review, 
debate, and synthesis of evidence from various research studies [2]. Optimization of lifesaving 
efforts around the world is dependent on accurate outcomes of this process. 
 
In the rare situations, in which there is a large number of consistently positive randomized 
clinical trials, consensus favoring change is easy. This situation, however, is highly unlikely in 
the domain of cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Compared with clinical trials of promising new 
drugs that are supported by large multinational corporations, trials of resuscitation techniques are 
underfunded and data poor. Even in a well-investigated field such as treatment of myocardial 
infarction [3,4], years, even decades, may pass as clinical trials accrue, yielding a mixture of 
seemingly ‘conflicting’ positive and neutral studies. In the domain of resuscitation, there has 
never been a method or technique supported by overwhelmingly positive data from multiple 
randomized clinical trials. Yet guideline writers must create guidelines anyway, striving to make 
the most efficient use of available data. 
 
In this sense, one can think of the evidence evaluation process as a diagnostic test to detect the 
presence of potential improvements in CPR, for which the concepts of sensitivity and specificity 
come into play. Ideal guideline writers would avoid both false-positive evaluations (concluding a 
guideline change is beneficial when in fact it is not) and false-negative evaluations (concluding a 
guideline change is of no benefit, when in fact it would be). If the process is not specific, 
rescuers and their instructors will be burdened by needless, ineffective changes. If the process is 
not sensitive, life-saving improvements in resuscitation technique will be missed. 
 
Lack of specificity corresponds to a ‘Type I’ statistical error or a false-positive conclusion. Lack 
of sensitivity corresponds to a ‘Type II’ statistical error or a false-negative conclusion [5]. In this 
paper, we shall examine the Type I and Type II errors inherent in consensus evidence evaluation 
in the field of resuscitation. Understanding of the underlying mathematical and statistical 










This paper presents a family of thought experiments to simulate the evidence-based review of 
series of randomized clinical trials, in which there is a known true difference in resuscitation 
success. Of particular interest is the probability of reaching an incorrect consensus decision as a 
function of the numbers of patients in individual clinical trials and the criteria that are used to 
reach ‘consensus’. In this way, one can examine the consequences of different evidence 
evaluation strategies. Nomenclature for the simulations is summarized in Table 1. All 
computations can be made readily on a routine Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, using arithmetic 
operators and functions for the square root, the binomial distribution, the normal distribution, and 
the inverse normal distribution. 
 






The general approach is first to determine the statistical power of hypothetical individual clinical 
trials in which the experimental resuscitation technique actually doubles survival. The statistical 
power of a trial is the probability of finding a statistically significant difference experimentally 
when a given true difference in survival between the experimental and control groups exists. 
Next, the binomial distribution for the number of significant positive studies in a series of 
similarly powered trials is determined. This distribution can be compared with the number of 
significant positive studies that would be required for approval by a review committee operating 
under various criteria for consensus. 
 
A strict committee would require a large number of significant positive trials; a more lenient 
committee would require a smaller number of positive trials. When the number of studies 
exceeds the consensus criterion, a true-positive recommendation will result. When the number of 
studies falls short of the consensus criterion, a false-negative recommendation, or Type II error, 
will result. In this way, one can study the frequencies of Type II errors under a variety of 
plausible conditions typical in the field of resuscitation. These can be compared with the 
frequencies of Type I errors under similar consensus criteria when there is, in fact, no difference 
between experimental and control treatments. In this way, one can explore when errors in 
evidence evaluation are likely to occur and in turn suggest strategies to minimize them. 
 
2.2. Describing an individual study 
 
Consider a single randomized clinical trial in which a new resuscitation method is compared with 
an old one. The experimental method might involve a new form of thoraco-abdominal 
compression, a new method of ventilation, a new drug, a new defibrillation waveform, or a new 
sequence of live-saving maneuvers. Since the purpose of resuscitation is the restoration of life, 
clinical trials ultimately focus on survival data [6–8]. Generally, one or more of three classical 
outcome measures is tabulated in such studies: return of spontaneous circulation (ROSC), 24 h 
survival, or survival to hospital discharge. The experimental CPR technique is judged superior if 
there is a statistically significant difference in at least one of these dichotomous variables. 
Generally, by the time randomized clinical trials are organized and approved, results of animal 
studies and non-randomized human studies have ruled out substantial safety concerns regarding 
the new method. Hence, the key question becomes whether the new method produces greater or 
less overall resuscitation success than standard CPR. 
 
The possible results of any such clinical trial can be described by the binomial sampling 
distributions shown in Fig. 1. These distributions show the range of possible outcomes of a 
particular clinical trial if the entire study were repeated a very large number of times in the same 
population. Here, the horizontal axis represents the difference between experimental and 
standard CPR in the proportion of immediate, 24 h, or discharge survivors. The vertical axis 
represents the probability density for the sampling distributions. ‘Probability density’ is scaled 
such that the area under each distribution is unity.  
 
The left-hand distribution is computed for the null hypothesis that 1 = 2. That is, the true 
probability, 2, of survival with experimental CPR is identical to the true probability, 1, of 
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survival with standard CPR. The mean difference is zero, as expected, but there is substantial 
variation. The right-hand distribution is computed for the alternative hypothesis that 2 > 1. 
Here the mean difference is positive, reflecting the true-positive effect. There is, however, 
substantial variation in possible outcomes of the trial. In a small percentage of cases, the 




Fig. 1. Example of a distribution of measured differences in proportions of survivors 
under the null hypothesis (‘No effect’) and an alternative hypothesis (‘True-positive 
effect’) for a model of 24 h survival data in which standard CPR results in 10% 
survival and experimental CPR results in 20% survival. The modal difference is the 
expected 10% increase. Random variability in the results produces substantial overlap. 
Here, there are 100 patients in each group. 
 
 
The curves in Fig. 1 represent a mathematical description of the possible results of a particular 
clinical trial, even though the actual difference in resuscitation success, 2 − 1, is constant. This 
inevitable variability of the binomial distribution occurs whenever one measures a dichotomous 
variable such as survival that describes each patient as a success or a failure, a plus or a minus, a 
1 or a zero. As the number of patients in each group increases, the standard deviation of the 
difference in the proportion of survivors between experimental and control groups decreases 
according to the formula [9, 10]: 
 





The dashed vertical line at the proportion, p*, on the horizontal axis of Fig. 1 represents the 
critical value for statistical significance. Given the null hypothesis that there is no real difference 
between the groups (2 = 1), the measured proportion of survivors in the experimental group 
would be greater than p*only a small proportion of the time. The area under the curve 
representing ‘No effect’ (open circles) to the right of p* is related to the Type I error, , which 
is the probability of concluding a significant effect of treatment exists (either positive or 
negative), when in fact there is no difference. This area is equal to /2 (typically, 0.025) for two-
sided or two-tailed tests of significance.  According to the usual decision rules for statistical 
significance, a study is considered ‘positive’ if the observed success in the experimental group is 
greater than p*. The study is considered neutral or ‘negative’ if the observed proportion of 
survivors in the experimental group is less than p*.  
 
The area under the curve representing a ‘True-positive effect’ (filled circles) to the left of p* is 
the Type II error, denoted , which is the probability of concluding there is no difference when 
in fact there is a difference. The area under the same curve to the right of p*, or 1 − , is the 
power of the study. The power is the probability of obtaining a statistically positive result when a 
true treatment effect is present (2 > 1). 
 
According to the difference in proportion test [9, 11, 12], the critical difference in measured 
proportions, p*, required for statistical significance can be computed from the inverse normal 
distribution function, F−1, as 
 




Here,  is the acceptable Type I error for a two-tailed test of significance, and  p1−p2  is the 
standard deviation of the difference in proportions, assuming the null hypothesis. For example, if 
1 − /2 is 0.975, then p* is the 97.5th percentile of a normal distribution with a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of p1−p2 . The value of p1−p2  is obtained exactly by evaluating the 
expression of Eq. (1) for 2 = 1. For the situation in which there is a true effect and 2 > 1, 
errors in statistical inference are Type II errors. For such a study, the Type II error, , is given by 
the cumulative normal distribution function, F, as 
 




This is the area from negative infinity to p* under a normal distribution with mean 2 − 1 and 
standard deviation p1−p2 . In turn, the power of the study, or the probability that the study will 




2.3. Describing likely treatment effects in resuscitation trials 
 
Treatment effects for typical resuscitation studies are easily imagined. For standard CPR, the 
approximate frequency of successful ROSC is about 25%, that of 24-h survival is about 10%, 
and that of hospital discharge is about 5% [13–18]. These values represent typical control 
outcome measures. Hypothetical large and small improvements in survival as the result of an 
experimental technique are indicated in Table 2. A large treatment effect is modeled as one that 
doubles positive outcome measures. For the purpose of comparison, a small treatment effect is 
modeled as one that improves outcome measures by 20%. 
 
 
Table 2  Hypothetical positive treatment effects for simulation of consensus decision making, 





2.4. Describing series of clinical trials 
 
Imagine an ideal world in which a particular resuscitation study could be replicated many times 
independently in the same general population of patients. Suppose each of the replicated studies 
consists of an experimental and a control group, for which survival data after resuscitation are 
reported. For present purposes, it will suffice to let all replications have the same total number of 
patients, N, and for simplicity to let the N patients in each study be equally divided between 
experimental and standard CPR. It then becomes straightforward to explore N as a parameter. 
 
Suppose there is a true treatment effect such that 2 > 1, as in Fig. 1 (filled circles). Table 3 
presents the formulae for calculating the probabilities of obtaining a given number of statistically 
significant, ‘positive’ studies in such a series of replications. These probabilities are derived from 
the basic independence, product, and addition rules of probability theory [19], and from the 
definition of the power of a study (1 − ). The left hand column in Table 3 presents the total 
number of studies in a series. Each column to the right indicates a given number of statistically 
8 
 
significant studies in a series, ranging from none of the studies in the series being significant to 
all of the studies in the series being significant.  
 
Table entries are the probabilities of obtaining the indicated number of statistically significant 
trials in a particular column under the assumed conditions. For example, if there is only one trial 
in the series, the probability that it will not be significant, despite a true effect is the Type II 
error, , and the probability that it will be significant is the power, 1 − . Accordingly, for a 
series containing only one study, the probability of obtaining zero positive studies in the series is 
, and the probability of obtaining one positive study in the series is 1 − . If there are two trials, 
the probability that both will be negative is 2 and the probability that both will be positive is  
(1 − )2. The probability that one will be positive and one will be negative is (1 − ), but there 
are two ways this can happen. Hence, the probability that one of the two studies will be 
statistically positive is 2(1 − ). This process can be continued for larger series, leading to the 
remaining entries in Table 3. The binomial nature of these probabilities is well known [20, 21]. 
 
 
Table 3  Probabilities of various outcomes for series of independently 





2.5. Describing consensus among evidence evaluators 
 
Although consensus is actually achieved by human judgment and group dynamics, members of 
the group seem to follow unconscious mathematical rules that can be used to create an 
operational definition of consensus for the purpose of the present analysis. This process has been 
described in the statistical literature as ‘vote counting’ by Hedges, Ingram, and other workers 
[10, 20–22]. In the vote-counting paradigm, each study ‘casts a vote’ in favor of the experimental 
intervention if it shows significant positive results. The study casts a vote against the intervention 
otherwise. The reviewers conclude there is a genuine treatment effect when there is a certain 
proportion or more of positive votes. 
 
Vote counting is probably the most common decision procedure used in traditional research 
reviewing. If the proportion of positive ‘votes’ is large, then the treatment under investigation 
presumably has an effect. For example, a group of evaluators might consider evidence 
compelling if 75% or more of trials are significantly positive. The group might then reach a 




Review committees are at liberty to select any such level, which may vary with the total number 
of studies. At the 75% level, it seems to be a safe bet to agree with a positive conclusion. 
However, when only one-half of the studies show a statistically significant positive effect, and 
one-half do not, many authorities tend to conclude, often erroneously, that the research is 
inconclusive and ‘more research is needed’ [10]. 
 
For the purposes of the present analysis, we shall define a consensus threshold, c, as the 
minimum proportion of statistically positive studies in a series that is judged sufficient to justify 
a strong recommendation of a new procedure. For example, a 3/4 consensus threshold would 
describe the thinking of a group convinced by four of four or three of four positive studies, but 
not by two of four. For larger series of replicated studies, the consensus threshold is just the 
overall fraction or percentage of statistically significant positive studies. 
 
2.6. False-positive consensus evaluations 
 
In situations in which there is no real treatment effect, evaluators can come to either a true-
negative or a false-positive consensus. The probability of reaching an incorrect, false-positive 
consensus in a series of replicated studies having the same two-tailed Type I error, , is easily 
computed. If there is only one study in the series, the probability of a false-positive result is /2. 
If there are two studies, A and B, and if a 2/2 consensus is required, the probability that both A 
and B are falsely positive, which is equal to the probability of a false-positive consensus, is 
(/2)(/2) = 2/4. For  = 0.05, this value is 0.000625. If only a 1/2 consensus is required, the 
probability is (2/4) + 2(/2)[1−(/2)]. This expression corresponds to the combined 
probabilities for A+/B+, or B+/A−, or B−/A+, where the superscript + means that the results of 
study were positive for two-sided significance level , and the superscript − means that they 
were not. For  = 0.05, the probability for a 1/2 consensus or better is 0.049375. In general, the 






refers to the number of combinations of m things taken k at a time [23]. 
 
2.7. False-negative consensus evaluations 
 
In situations in which there is a true treatment effect, evaluators can come to either a true-
positive or a false-negative consensus. In these situations, the probability of obtaining a false-
negative consensus is 1 minus the probability of obtaining a true-positive consensus. The 
probability of obtaining a true-positive consensus for a given consensus threshold may be 




Eq. (5a) can be expressed more compactly in terms of the cumulative binomial distribution 
function B(s, t, p) for  s  successes in  t  trials with probability  p. This function is available in 
Microsoft Excel and was used for spreadsheet computations. Using this function, Eq. (5a) is 
equivalent to 
 




In turn, the probabilities of coming to a false-negative consensus for each consensus threshold 
may be computed as 
 






2.8. Design of simulations 
 
Using the forgoing concepts, one can perform a series of thought experiments to explore the 
outcome of the evaluation of a series of studies that compare an experimental treatment with a 
standard treatment as a function of three key variables. These include the number of patients in 
each study, the true difference, if any, in resuscitation success, and the consensus threshold. Of 
special interest are the probabilities of false-positive and false-negative evaluations as functions 




3.1. False-positive consensus decisions 
 
Table 4 shows values computed from Eq. (4) for series of four, six, eight, and ten studies, 
assuming  = 0.5.  Each column represents the total number of studies and each row represents 
the minimum number of positive studies in the series for a positive consensus. Table entries are 
probabilities that a positive consensus would be reached when there is in fact no difference 
between treatment groups, i.e. 2 = 1. In this situation, all errors of research evaluation and 
synthesis are Type I errors. Whenever there are more than two positive studies in a series, the 
values in Table 4 are quite small. For series of four or six studies, the presence of only two 
positive studies excludes the null hypothesis at the P = 0.01 level (bold font). That is, the 
probability that the null hypothesis is correct is less than 1%. For series of eight or ten studies the 
presence of only three positive studies excludes the null hypothesis at the P = 0.01 level. Thus, as 
previously described [10, 20], only two or three significant positive studies are required to reject 
the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 4 Probabilities of false-positive consensus decisions based on a series of replicated studies 





These results are independent of the particular kinds of data or significance tests used in the 
studies. They are also independent of the number of patients, N, in any of the studies, because the 
N values of the individual studies are already taken into account in selecting the critical values 




3.2. False-negative consensus decisions 
 
For cases in which 2 is greater than 1, the errors in evidence evaluation are Type II errors. 
Here, the probabilities of false-negative consensus decisions are dependent on study N values. 
For simplicity in the present analysis, we assume the same N for all studies in the series. Fig. 2 
illustrates probabilities for false-negative conclusions as a function of N in a variety of scenarios 
in which the true difference in survival for experimental CPR is twice that for standard CPR, i.e. 
2 = 21. Three different control levels of survival are modeled as indicated in Table 2, 























Fig. 2. Probabilities of 
reaching a false-negative 
consensus from series of 
replicated clinical trials, 
given an actual twofold 
improvement in 
resuscitation success. 
Separate charts describe 
scenarios simulating three 
different survival endpoints 
commonly measured in 
resuscitation research. 
Clustered groups of three 
curves represent possible 
consensus criteria. Solid 
symbols indicate that at 
least one-half of studies 
must show a significantly 
positive result with  = 
0.05. Smaller open symbols 
indicate that at least one-
quarter of studies must 
show a significantly 
positive result. Larger open 
symbols indicate that at 
least three-quarters of 
studies must show a 
significantly positive result. 
Symbol types represent the 
number of studies to be 
evaluated: circles, four 
studies; triangles, eight 
studies; squares, 16 
studies. (a) Stimulates 
discharge survival, (b) 24-h 






For each control survival level (a)–(c), the probabilities of false-negative evaluations are plotted 
as a function of the total number of patients, N, in each of the replicated studies. Keep in mind 
that for every case the true probability of survival for experimental CPR, 2, is twice that of 
control CPR, 1. The nine curves in each chart appear in groups of three. Each group represents a 
different consensus threshold. The middle group (solid symbols) represents a consensus 
threshold of 50%. That is, evaluators require 50% or more of the reviewed studies to show 
statistically significant results before reaching a consensus that the innovation under study is 
truly effective. The left-hand group of three curves (small open symbols) represents a less 
stringent consensus threshold of 25%. The right hand group of three curves (larger open 
symbols) represents a more conservative consensus threshold of 75%. The three curves within 
each group indicate the evaluation of four, eight, or 16 similar studies. Circles indicate a series of 
four studies, triangles a series of eight studies, and squares a series of 16 studies. 
 
Fig. 2(a) shows results typical of long-term, discharge survival as an end-point. Long-term 
survival is the most valued end point in resuscitation research, based on the laudable desire of 
both patients and clinicians to eschew methods that restore circulation but prolong life only a few 
hours or days. Such methods would increase cost and suffering without increasing quality of life. 
Compared with the probabilities for false-positive evaluations in Table 4, the plotted 
probabilities for false negative evaluations in Fig. 2(a) are large. For small to medium sized 
studies, including fewer than 1000 patients, the chances of false-negative evaluations can be 50% 
or greater for long-term survival endpoints.  
 
For reference, the mean study N values in current trials of experimental CPR is in the range of 
300 total patients [16, 17]. Brown et al.’s review of negative studies in emergency medicine [12] 
found a mean N of 82 and range of 12–394 for the number of patients in both experimental and 
control groups. In this range of N, the probability of making a false-negative consensus 
evaluation of an experimental method that in fact doubles long-term discharge survival is very 
high.  
 
The sensitivity of the evidence evaluation process is 1 minus the probability of reaching a false-
negative consensus. For studies with N in the range of 50–500 patients, the sensitivity of 
evidence evaluation based on long-term survival data is roughly 50%. That is, the overall 
assessment of research literature is correct about half the time. For realistically conservative 
consensus criteria, requiring at least 50% of eight or more studies to be statistically 
significant, the ability of the evidence evaluation process to recognize an innovation that 
actually doubles long term survival is less than 10%. In order for the probability of false-
negative consensus to become less than 10%, the studies must include 1000 or more patients 
each. The consensus threshold does have a large influence on the sensitivity of the evidence 
evaluation process, especially for small to medium sized studies. Only when total study N is 
greater than 1000 is the process insensitive to the consensus threshold. 
 
Results within each group of curves are also revealing and important. Consider the solid symbols 
in Fig. 2(a). These represent a consensus threshold of 50%. Note that when the curve height is 
greater than about 0.2, the probability of false-negative evaluation actually increases as the 
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number of studies to be integrated increases from four to 16. Hedges and Olkin described this 
counterintuitive effect in 1980 [20]. We shall refer to it as the Hedges–Olkin paradox. The 
paradox is that, under certain conditions, the larger the number of studies conducted, the greater 
is the certainty of reaching the false conclusion that there is no effect. This paradox is a genuine 
consequence of the laws of probability. 
 
The necessary conditions for the Hedges–Olkin paradox are common in resuscitation research 
and occur when the statistical power of the studies is less than the consensus threshold. The 
Hedges–Olkin paradox is true because, if a given study were replicated a large number of times, 
the proportion of replications with statistically significant results would be equal to the power. 
Consequently, if the power is less than the consensus threshold then, as more studies are carried 
out, the proportion of positive studies will tend to become less than the consensus threshold. This 
conclusion is also true if the study powers vary, but the average power is less than the consensus 
threshold ([21], p. 52). Thus, under conditions common in the field of resuscitation, the 
sensitivity of the consensus process to detect true-positive effects decreases as the number of 
studies reviewed increases! In turn, the probability that a research review reaches the correct 
decision tends toward zero as more research is carried out [20]! 
 
This disturbing situation is improved slightly by choosing end points with greater 1, such as 24-
h survival or immediate survival after attempted resuscitation (ROSC). For typical 24-h survival 
with 1 in the range of 0.1, the evaluation of studies with N values in the range 100–200 has a 
50% sensitivity with a 50% consensus threshold (Fig. 2(b)). The Hedges–Olkin paradox is still in 
effect, however. When 1 is in the range of 0.25, corresponding to the ROSC end-point, then 
consensus evidence evaluation is capable of detecting an effect with a sensitivity greater than 
90% for typically powered resuscitation studies (Fig. 2(c)). 
 
The results in Fig. 2 were computed for studies reflecting a large, two-fold, improvement in 
resuscitation success. Fig. 3 illustrates similar results for more modest, incremental 
improvements in survival of 20%. Similar patterns of findings occur as before. However, the N 
values required to achieve a given level of sensitivity are much larger. False-negative evaluations 
are much more likely with small N studies typical of resuscitation research. For the endpoint of 























Fig. 3. Probabilities of 
reaching a false-negative 
consensus from series of 
replicated clinical trials 
given an actual 20% 
improvement in resus-
citation success. Other 
details similar to Fig. 2. 





Extremely large N values are required to obtain adequate sensitivity of the evaluation process — 
probably so large that cost would be prohibitive. Even using ROSC as the only endpoint, greater 
than 1000 patients in each study are needed. Only one recent resuscitation study has included this 
many patients [24]. Smaller positive effects are almost impossible to detect. These findings 
suggest that, in the field of resuscitation, traditional methods of research review and consensus 
development cannot lead to gradual improvement of guidelines by a series of small incremental 
steps. Only improvements with a large (e.g. two-fold or greater) impact upon outcome are likely 




The laws of probability and statistics have a lot to say about the way resuscitation research is 
conducted and the way resuscitation guidelines are created. Although studies of blood flow and 
hemodynamics deserve close scrutiny, the ultimate dependent variable in resuscitation is a 
dichotomous one—survival—putting investigators at the mercy of the binomial distribution. 
 
The extreme pathophysiology of sudden cardiac death, often including long down times and 
severe underlying disease, limits both control survival rates (1) and possible improvements in 
survival rate (2 − 1) even with the best of treatments. Small values of these parameters drive up 
the study N values needed to avoid both Type I and Type II errors in evidence evaluation.  
 
Unfortunately, resuscitation has been an ‘orphan research domain’, underfunded by federal 
governments and by multinational drug companies. Hence, N values of most resuscitation studies 
are small. Under these conditions, the traditional concepts of research reviewing often cannot 
function reliably to recognize clinically significant improvements when they are discovered. The 
metaphor of ‘weighing’ the evidence that underlies traditional research synthesis seems 
intuitively fair. One simply stacks up the significantly positive studies in one hand and the non-
significant, neutral studies in the other hand with some attention to their technical merits. If one 
stack is larger than the other, the decision seems obvious. This approach has deep roots in our 
system of justice and our normal approach to making choices in life by weighing ‘pros’ and 
‘cons’.  
 
This vote counting approach, however, is mathematically erroneous. The error is revealed in Fig. 
1, and has to do with the properties of dichotomous variables with binomial distributions. In the 
presence of a true effect, some studies will show no apparent difference, especially 
underpowered ones. Studies showing no statistically significant difference are not necessarily 
‘negatives’ or ‘cons’. One such study does not necessarily ‘cancel’ a significant positive study. It 
should be seen as part of a larger distribution. 
 
A related misunderstanding is that conventional significance testing ensures accurate decisions 
about treatment effects. This reasonable sounding idea is only partly correct. Conventional 
significance testing only minimizes Type I errors. It does not in any way protect against Type II 
errors [12]. Indeed, over-reliance on conventional significance tests by requiring smaller and 
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smaller P values actually increases the number of Type II errors and reduces the overall accuracy 
of evidence evaluation. 
 
In this setting, reliance on conventional methods of research reviewing and consensus will 
sacrifice many, perhaps most, genuine innovations in resuscitation technique. In particular, the 
current approach to guideline development would seem to obviate a series of successive 
incremental improvements (5% better ROSC here, 10% better ROSC there), which might have a 
substantial combined impact on overall success. Large, roughly two-fold improvements in 
resuscitation success, such as those reported by Sack et al. for interposed abdominal compression 
CPR [25] have been quite rare. As a result, major improvements in basic CPR have not appeared 
since its introduction in 1960 [26, 27]. In turn, researchers tend to become discouraged because 
their work, even when successful, never makes it into the guidelines. 
 
Inspection of the results in Table 4 describing Type I errors, together with those in Figs. 2 and 3 
describing Type II errors, leads to a simple approximate rule for eliminating many, but not all, 
systematic errors in evidence evaluation. This rule of thumb might be called the ‘two and one 
quarter test’. If the same intervention is tested repeatedly in the same population, and if there are 
at least two well-conducted significant positive trials representing one-quarter or more of all 
trials performed, then one can conclude with reasonable accuracy that the innovation under study 
has a true-positive effect. This simple test can serve as a poor man’s meta-analysis. One only has 
to count to two and to divide by four. This way of counting studies is much less stringent than 
the consensus criteria used by many research reviewers. Yet it is based soundly on the 
mathematical realities of the binomial distribution.  
 
The two and one quarter test is of course an approximation. It remains a form of vote counting. 
All forms of vote counting include a systematic bias toward Type II errors [22], especially when 
studies are substantially underpowered or the experimental effects are small (Figs. 2 and 3). A 
better way to obtain both increased sensitivity and increased specificity of evidence evaluation is 
to conduct a formal meta-analysis, which does not suffer from the systematic bias of vote 
counting or from the Hedges–Olkin paradox. The details of meta-analysis are beyond the scope 
of the present paper. The reader is referred to the cited references for an introduction to this 
topic. The two and one quarter test suggested here, however, can be used to identify candidate 
interventions for formal meta-analysis. 
 
Specific examples in need of meta-analysis in the field of resuscitation include interposed 
abdominal compression CPR (IAC-CPR) and active compression decompression CPR (ACD-
CPR). Both methods have been shown in more than two randomized clinical trials to produce 
clinical benefit in human beings compared with standard CPR. In both cases, the positive trials 
constitute more than one-quarter of the randomized clinical trials performed [1]. Of course, 
analysis of these real world innovations is more complex than the simple thought experiments 
presented in the present paper. In particular, the same intervention was not necessarily tested in 
all studies, because the techniques for performing IAC-CPR and ACD-CPR have evolved and 
improved with time and experience.  
 
Also, the studies of these techniques were not always replicated in the same populations. There 
are pre-hospital versus in-hospital trials. There are trials in different countries with different 
19 
 
health care systems by rescuers with different degrees of training [1]. Still, some of the 
variability in the results of multiple trials must have been caused by random variation of the 
binomial distribution, i.e. by luck. Typically, research reviewers tend to underestimate the 
‘normal’ amount of random variation in binomial data and over-interpret apparent differences. A 
humorous account of this tendency is provided by Hunter and Schmidt [10]. For interventions 
such as IAC-CPR and ACD-CPR that pass the two and one quarter test, more sophisticated 
techniques than those of traditional consensus development are needed to improve the accuracy 
of the evidence evaluation process. 
 
The techniques of meta-analysis, a general term for quantitatively combining evidence from 
related but independent studies, have recently become popular in the clinical literature. These 
methods have been well reviewed [10, 21 ,22, 28–31] and deserve serious consideration by 
guidelines writers. One important innovation is the technique of cumulative meta-analysis of 
outcome data, developed by Lau, Mosteller, Chalmers, and coworkers [3, 4]. Cumulative meta-
analysis is defined as the performance of an updated meta-analysis every time a new trial 
appears. This approach simplifies the process of integrating data from multiple clinical trials, and 
makes it possible to pinpoint the earliest time when the combined results of clinical trials first 
achieve statistical significance. Importantly, meta-analysis eliminates the Hedges–Olkin paradox. 
Meta-analysis also tends to focus more attention on actual data, balancing the contributions of 
non-native English speakers, less domineering personalities, and less persistent advocates with 




The results of the present study suggest that evidence for new resuscitation guidelines need not 
be ‘compelling’ in the sense that a majority or a super-majority of published studies are 
statistically significant. Many positive life-saving innovations would probably never be 
implemented under these conditions. Indeed, they would only be adopted if the proportion of 
positive studies were much greater than normally expected on the basis of probability theory. 
This means that the measured treatment effects (p2 − p1) would have to be substantially greater 
than the true treatment effects (2 − 1) — a matter of luck rather than merit.  
 
A long term consequence of this situation is that subsequent clinical results of a few lucky 
techniques would necessarily tend to be ‘disappointing’, i.e. closer to the true average outcome 
than to the initial lucky outcome. In turn, observers would tend to grow cynical about future 
innovations, perhaps requiring even more conservative consensus criteria and creating a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Unknowingly at the mercy of the Hedges–Olkin paradox, guideline writers 
would increasingly view resuscitation research as muddled, unproductive, and conflicting. 
Change would be put off once more, with yet another call for more data. A better approach 
would be a more realistic one, permitting modest incremental improvements based on the two 
and one quarter test, followed by unbiased meta-analysis of available results.  
 
Ideally, consensus guidelines should be a conduit for the prompt transfer of effective innovations 
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